‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات سوريا. إظهار كافة الرسائل
‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات سوريا. إظهار كافة الرسائل

الأحد، 27 فبراير 2011

Rage, Rap and Revolution: Inside the Arab Youth Quake



At 6:30 p.m. on Feb. 15, as thousands of people gathered to protest against their ruler at a busy intersection in Manama, the capital of the small island nation of Bahrain, you could just about hear over the general hubbub the anthem of the young people who have shaken regimes from North Africa to the Arabian Gulf. It wasn't a verse from the Koran. It wasn't a traditional tune from the region. It was rap. A reedy female voice shouted out, several times, the first line of "Rais Lebled," a song written by the Tunisian rapper known as El Général. "Mr. President, your people are dying," the woman sang. Then others joined in. "Mr. President, your people are dying/ People are eating rubbish/ Look at what is happening/ Miseries everywhere, Mr. President/ I talk with no fear/ Although I know I will get only trouble/ I see injustice everywhere."
Bahrain, as it happens, doesn't have a President; it's ruled by a King, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa. No matter. The protesters in Bahrain knew that "Rais Lebled" was the battle hymn of the Jasmine Revolution that brought down Tunisia's dictator, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, and that it was then adopted by the demonstrators in Cairo's Tahrir Square who toppled Hosni Mubarak. Now it had come to Bahrain, as rage against poverty and oppression swept the Arab world from west to east. It isn't just songs that are being copied: in a nod to the Egyptians, organizers in several countries have dubbed their demonstrations Days of Rage, and the popular Tunisian chant, "The people want the regime to fall," has been taken up by protesters from Algeria to Yemen.
But the most important things 2011's protests have in common don't come from copying — they come naturally. All of the revolts are led by young men and women, many of whom are novices at political activism. All use modern tools, like social-networking sites on the Internet and texting over mobile phones, to organize and amplify their protests. And all have the same demands: a right to choose and change their leaders, an end to rampant corruption, the opportunity for employment and improvement. "Whether you're in Tunis or in Cairo or in Manama," says Ala'a Shehabi, 30, a Bahraini economics lecturer and political activist, "young Arabs are all on the same wavelength."
In less than two months, this generation has already wrought political change on a scale not seen since the end of the Cold War. The class of 2011 has felled two despots and forced other famously inflexible rulers to make concessions, some dramatic (Yemen's longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh has promised not to run for re-election) and some desperate (King Hamad has offered every Bahraini household the equivalent of $2,700). And all this was achieved by largely peaceful demonstrations and despite the absence of clear leaders.
There may be more to come. Growing protests in Bahrain and Yemen could lead to greater concessions from their rulers. And the Arab uprising has already given a boost to the flagging Green Revolution in Iran. (That, in turn, has provoked a fierce crackdown by government forces.) There have also been demonstrations in Libya against the regime of "Brother Leader" Muammar Gaddafi. So who are the Middle East's new revolutionaries? Where do they come from, and what do they want?
Getting the Young People Wrong
Even those who have watched this generation come of age in the Middle East struggle to explain its sudden empowerment. "These young people have done more in a few weeks than their parents did in 30 years," says Hassan Nafaa, a political-science professor at Cairo University. "They are the Internet Generation ... or the Facebook Generation ... or just call them the Miracle Generation."
Yet not so long ago, these were the men and women who were being called the lost generation. For years, Middle East experts had described Arab youths as frustrated but feckless: they disliked and distrusted their authoritarian rulers, they keenly felt their limited economic prospects, but they were too politically emasculated to press for change. They were thoroughly intimidated by the Mubaraks and Salehs, together with their ubiquitous, Orwellian spies and secret police; they were disillusioned by the failed attempts at rebellion by their parents' generation. Western observers were not alone in misreading this generation's potential. "If you had said some years ago that my students would be responsible for democratic change in Egypt, I would have laughed," admits Nafaa.
According to the old narrative, the only outlet for youthful dissent lay in Islamic extremism and violence. A much cited 2003 Brookings Institution report on Arab youths warned that they were being raised in an environment of religious radicalism and anti-Americanism. "These values," the report argued, "thus become the formative elements of a new and dispossessed generation, auguring badly for the future."
The auguries were wrong. In reality, Arab youths were a big part of the silent, moderate majority. In virtually every Arab country, more than half the population is less than 30 years old. And like young people everywhere, most of them prefer the freedom that comes with democracy to the straitjacket of political autocracy or rule by religious conservatives. A survey of youths in nine Arab states released in 2010 by the p.r. firm Asda'a Burson-Marsteller showed that they ranked democracy as a greater priority than good civic infrastructure, access to the best education or even fair wages

Granted, these young people may not all have a clear vision of what kind of democracy they want, only that it is accompanied by free and fair elections. But that counts for a generation that has only ever known one ruler, the opportunity to kick one out every four or five years may be democracy's greatest appeal. "I don't care who ends up running this country," says Egyptian student Khaled Kamel, "as long as I have the ability to change them if I don't like them."
A Thousand Sparks
If most foreigners couldn't put the sheer numbers of Arab youths together with their political aspirations to measure their clout, neither did the young Arabs themselves. Jared Cohen, director of the corporate think tank Google Ideas, who until recently worked on online outreach at the U.S. State Department, says young people were the "de facto opposition in many of these countries, but they didn't see their own power."

As always, it needed a thousand little sparks to light the fire of revolt — to reveal to those who thought they were weak how much power they really had. Kamel, a university student from the Nile Delta village of Zawiyat Ghazal, recalls when he fell from a train at a station and a policeman came up to him. "Instead of helping me, he hit me because I was lying there on the platform, which you're not supposed to do," says Kamel. That sort of humiliation at the hands of authority was common-place in Mubarak's Egypt, but Kamel, 20, had an outlet for his frustrations: an ancient Hewlett-Packard PC and an Internet connection. He created a blog and chronicled his anger in sarcastic prose.
Then last summer, another instance of police brutality became the talk of the Egyptian online community: in Alexandria, a young businessman named Khaled Said was beaten to death by cops. A Facebook page entitled "We Are All Khaled Said" was created by an anonymous administrator. Kamel joined the Facebook group and became one of its lead organizers. He got to know the group's administrator online, and the two began an e-mail conversation. It wasn't until Feb. 7 that Kamel finally learned the identity of his correspondent: Wael Ghonim, the Google executive who has become the face of the Egyptian revolution.

Kamel's first sense that his activism could help change the entire system came when he worked with Ghonim and others to plan a day of protests on Jan. 25. While Cairo and Tahrir Square got the most international attention during the uprising, Kamel concentrated on rallying protesters across the country, marching with them in Alexandria and in the nearby town of Damanhur, where fleeing officials set fire to the state security headquarters.
Now Kamel walks through the burned and ransacked building, pointing to cells where security officers brutalized prisoners with dogs and electric prods. He exudes a sense of wonder that his generation put an end to these abuses. "We have forces now," he says. "And we're starting from right now to build Egypt the way we wanted to."
If Said's murder at the hands of the police spurred young Egyptians into action, in Tunisia it was the self-immolation of vegetable vendor Mohammed Bouazizi after he was slapped by a policewoman. In Yemen, activist Tawakul Karman was moved by the plight of 30 families expelled in early 2007 from their village when the land was given to a tribal leader close to President Saleh. The families are known collectively as Ja'ashin, after the name of their village, and Karman, 32, a mother of three, has made them her cause: every Tuesday since 2007, she and scores of others have protested in front of Sana'a University.

Her tenacity has yielded nothing: the government has refused to intervene on the Ja'ashin's behalf. Karman now believes that only Saleh's resignation — he's been in power three years longer than Mubarak was — will allow Yemen to start addressing its problems. Like activists elsewhere, she finds her spirits raised by what's happened in Tunisia and Egypt. The ranks of protesters at Sana'a University have swelled to the thousands. Several protests have been broken up by police or armed supporters of the regime, but Karman is undaunted. "Now there's a race between Yemen and Algeria to see who will be next," she says.
Not all the activist Arab youths are looking for regime change. In Ramallah, the capital of the Palestinian territories, Fadi Quran has set his sights on what are arguably more difficult goals: unification of the warring Palestinian factions of Fatah and Hamas, followed by an end to the Israeli occupation. Quran, 22, a Stanford University grad who runs an alternative-energy start-up, set up a Facebook account calling for a sit-in in front of the Egyptian embassy while Mubarak was clinging to power in Cairo. But he was forced to take it down by the Palestinian Authority's security services and was then questioned for hours. "It truly was obvious they had never had to deal with this type of activism before," he says

Quran and several other Palestinian activists are now planning a wave of demonstrations to demand that Fatah and Hamas reconcile, the better to "fight the occupation in a much more efficient and productive manner." Quran is counting on young Palestinians to brush aside the failed policies of their elders. "They can't find any answers because they're stuck in the box," he says. "But when the youth comes in, they're going to see a new vision, and we're going to achieve the goals of our struggle."
Doing It for Themselves
The revolution of the young generation in the Middle East is theirs and theirs alone — spokespeople have been specific in dismissing the idea that they have needed outside assistance or have looked much to the outside for inspiration

Even so, their actions have been such that policymakers far from the Middle East now have to react to a new reality, recalibrate policies long based on convenient relationships with despots and build connections with this new source of political strength. That's especially true for the U.S., which many Arab activists regard as the great power that enabled their oppressors. "The U.S. government was aware of the injustices in Egypt but continued supporting Mubarak because of self-interest," says a Bahraini activist who asked that his or her name be withheld. "No one can argue that Saudi Arabia is the home of human rights or democracy, yet America continues to support the regime."
Still, for the Obama Administration, there's good news too. So far, there have been few instances of President Obama being burned in effigy or of the U.S. flag being torched by angry mobs. The State Department insists that it has long been paying attention to the needs and aspirations of young Arabs. "This has been a key demographic for us for quite some time," says a State Department official. Funding for youth outreach has increased significantly in recent years. The U.S. now spends more to support democracy and governance in the Arab world every year than the $250 million it spent in total from 1991 to 2001.
(Read "Joe Klein: How the U.S. Should Support Middle East Reform.")
Many programs are deliberately low-key, in part because an open association with the U.S. can be politically damaging. "It's really been very hard for most people in the Arab world to work directly with the U.S. government," says Ethan Zuckerman, one of the founders of Global Voices, an international network of bloggers and citizen journalists that has hosted regional conferences for Arab bloggers.
As the old order crumbles, the U.S. will want these new relationships to strengthen into lasting bonds. But Arab youths are unlikely to feel the need for U.S. support as acutely as the leaders who came before them. After all, they didn't need U.S. help to get rid of those dictators. "People said it couldn't happen, because the U.S. supported Mubarak, but still he fell," says the Bahraini activist. "Now we know we don't need the U.S. on our side to get what we want. Now we know we can do it for ourselves." Faced with such self-confidence, the Obama Administration must manage the delicate task of maintaining support for regimes in the region while telling Arab leaders, in public and private, to address the turmoil with more urgent reforms — all while trying to increase direct contact with the youths leading the uprisings.
That will not be easy. Foreign policy considerations couldn't be further from the minds of most members of the class of 2011. For young Arabs in Yemen, Libya and Algeria, there are regimes still to topple. The revolution hasn't yet gotten off the ground in Syria and is still in its early days in Bahrain. And in Tunisia and Egypt, the gains from the past two months need to be protected: there are political parties to form, elections to contest. The military council that took over from Mubarak has promised constitutional reforms and elections in six months.

Many of the young men and women who helped make the revolutions happen are keen to hold on to the sense of blissful dawn they have experienced for the first time in their young lives. Ahmed Khalil, scion of a wealthy Egyptian business family and a veteran of Tahrir Square, hasn't returned to work even though his plastics factory reopened several days ago: there are more important things now than making money, he says. Khalil, 29, is part of the "Revolution Friends" Facebook group that is exploring ways to channel the revolution's momentum into a civic-awareness campaign. He has printed leaflets, now being distributed throughout Cairo, calling on his fellow Egyptians to work "for a better Egypt and to protect the victory that you and I achieved with our own hands." (Sample suggestions: "Don't litter, don't blow your car horn for no reason, don't pay bribes, don't allow a police officer to humiliate someone in front of you, don't harass girls on the street, know your rights, stay positive, respect other opinions.")
And what of the revolution's rapper? El Général — his given name is Hamada Ben Amor — is disappointed he missed some of the action: he was jailed for three days during the Jasmine Revolution, and when Egyptian protesters invited him to perform in Tahrir Square, he couldn't go because he has no passport. Instead, he's written a new rap called "Vive Tunisie!" that honors Tunisian protesters and those killed during the uprising. There are shout-outs, too, to other youth movements. "I also speak about the program of freedom in Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Morocco," he says. The youth of the Arab world are not done yet

الأربعاء، 16 فبراير 2011

What Does the Future Hold for Syria


The demographic challenge

Like most countries in the region, Syria has experienced rapid population increase since independence in 1946. According to the UN, total fertility or the number of children that the average Syrian woman gives birth to in Syria averaged 6.44 over the last 60 years. As one would expect, this rate had declined, but still averages 5.85 children per woman since 1970. Syria’s fertility rate today stands at 3.02 (2010), while Turkey’s is 2.18 (2010), Egypt’s is 3.01 (2010), and Yemen’s is an astonishing 4.81 (2010). For the record, the U.S. and Western Europe averaged 1.95 and 1.64 respectively since 1970. Run away population growth in Syria explains why the percentage of the population under the age of 14 is nearly 40% and those over 65 are a mere 3% (it is 18% in Western Europe). Is it any wonder that Egyptians feel that Mr. Mubarak is too old? Only 0.4% of Egyptians are 82 years old. Needless to say, most Syrians can identify with their president who is in his 40s; some 60% of Syrians are between the ages of 15 and 59?

Unemployment trumps all

It is an accepted truth that the Arab world can do with less corruption and more democracy and freedom, but none of this is likely to matter much if rapid population growth is paired with slow economic growth. The 40% of the people who are under the age of 14 will be looking for work in a few short years. To make matters worse, Syria, like others countries of the region, has one of the lowest women labor participation rates in the world – only 21%(2008) of Syrian females between 15 and 29 years of age are currently in the labor force. This is also likely to increase. Both demographic groups are expected to exert significant and steady pressure on Syria’s future unemployment rate.

Real Economic Growth

While Syria’s population almost doubled between 1975 and 2000, real (inflation adjusted) income growth was largely stagnant. The economic reform process of the past decade has brought the country faster growth, but not nearly enough given the population growth. While analysts and experts alike may offer a laundry list of reasons for the events in Egypt, there is little doubt the protests are primarily linked to the country’s failure to boost economic growth. Per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product divided by the population) is a useful indicator. In 20 years, Egypt’s nominal per capita income has remained stagnant at USD $2,155. It has not grown at all. Factor in inflation and it becomes clear that real standards of living have actually fallen. There can be no surprise why Egypt’s youth poured into Tahrir Square to protest. It was only a matter of time.

Compare Egypt to Turkey

Over the same 20 years, nominal per capita income in Turkey grew by nearly 275%; it grew from $2,160 to $8,300 today. Had Egyptians been earning close to four times more than they were in 1990, one wonders if they would have taken over Tahrir in protest. Syria must emulate Turkey and not Egypt:

The best way to achieve this is by developing an increased sense of urgency about the need to accelerate economic growth and cut population growth. Patience in this case is not a virtue. Neither is indecisiveness. Every member of Syria’s economic team must get behind the reform agenda. Too much is at stake for indecision and backbiting.

Growth without population control will not cut it. According to the UN, Syria’s current population growth rate is 3.26%. This means that the population will double to 45 million by 2032, a short 22 years from now. However, were the birth rate to drop by a full percentage point to 2.25%, the doubling of the population to 45 million will be delayed till 2042, giving it ten extra years to grow the economy. Turkey’s current population growth rate of %1.24 is a full two percentage points lower than that of Syria’s. Were Syria’s population growing at Turkey’s rate, it would have until 2067, or 35 extra years, to raise incomes for the same amount of people.

When discussing economic growth, it is important to emphasize the difference between nominal (current dollars) and real (constant dollars) growth. The former does not factor in inflation. The latter does. The distinction between the two measures becomes more pronounced in high inflation environments. One may experience a growth rate in incomes of say 5% but if inflation is also at 5%, real (constant dollar) income growth is zero. This is why it is hard to achieve real economic growth rates of 7 and 8 percent when an economy is experiencing inflation of 5%. Nominal or actual incomes would have to grow by 13% to experience a real growth rate of 8%.

Turkey’s reform process kicked into high gear in the early 1980’s under the leadership of the late Turgot Ozal. For Syria to achieve Turkey’s per capita growth rate of the past 25 years, it must do two things: 1- It must grow its economy by a real inflation-adjusted 8.5% if population growth continues at 3.26%. 2- It can grow by a real inflation-adjusted 6.5% if it succeeds in slowing its population growth down to Turkey’s current level of 1.25%. Either option presents a formidable challenge and highlights the feat that Turkey has pulled off since 1980. Growing an economy at an inflation-adjusted rate of 8.5% is of course what China has been able to do recently (if you trust the country’s statisticians). Chinese planners have also been able to drop the country’s population growth rate to low of 0.63%.

Syria must tackle its population growth challenge

The late Yasser Arafat once famously said that “the womb of the Arab woman is my strongest weapon”. The region had long held the belief that high total fertility rates are positively correlated with economic and strategic strength. Up to a few years ago, Syria used to hand out medals to women who conceived 12 children or more. As a result, family planning was never thought of as applicable public policy for the region. This must change. Syria’s resources cannot keep pace with the present galloping population growth. Water will run out and incomes will fall. We can all imagine a number of nightmare scenarios about how thing will begin to go wrong.

But the World has many examples of countries that have conquered run away population growth. Thailand is one such example. In 1974, the average Thai mother gave birth to 7 children. The politicians understood that they faced ruin unless they got control of the problem. Along came Mechai Viravaidya. His solution? Walk around the country handing out condoms. Over the past 36 years, the Thai state took up the example and has brought down the number of children per mother from 7 to 1.5. Ask about “Mr. Condom” in Thailand today. He is a hero. China of course saw the need for even more draconian action back in 1979. Chinese economic planners understood that unless they slowed down the population growth rates and significantly increased economic growth, the country also faced ruin.

By all accounts, the current demographic trend in the Arab world is a train wreck. Most Arab leaders will fail unless they can convince their societies that nothing else matters if they can’t control their exploding population growth. Until then, economic reforms will fail. More stomachs will go empty; and more kids will come of age with no prospect of finding an honest job. The old Arabic adage that a new born baby will carry his riz-keto (fortune) with him must be ridiculed. It is no longer funny. The Urgent Need for Economic Growth

Even if Syria implements an aggressive family planning policy soon, significant population growth changes take time. This leaves most of the burden on faster economic growth to raise the country’s per capita GDP. Since 2003, real growth has averaged between 3.4% and 4.8%. At this rate, Syria’s per capita incomes will grow at half the speed that Turkey’s did over its past 30 years. This leaves Syria with little room for error. Losing one or two percentage points of growth exposes Syria to Egyptian sized problems – stagnant per capita income over the next two decades and a population of 40 million.

Syria’s economic planners understand this dynamic for they have targeted a real growth rate of 7 to 8 percent. However, doubling real incomes is not easy and requires that Syria’s economy fire on all cylinders. It must get its legislative, fiscal and monetary policy in sync. I think that even the government would admit that this is yet to happen. The area of legislation, in particular, needs urgent attention. Rather than embracing best-practices that already work in the rest of the world, legislators seem to get bogged down in a bureaucratic maze that ends in legislation that lacks clarity, simplicity or business friendliness. A word on Subsidies:

Middle and low income families spend up to 50% of their incomes on food. Over the past 4 decades, the Syrian state subsidized a list of basic commodities and energy products as part of its socialist economic strategy. When this policy was adopted, the Syrian population was barely 6 million. The Soviet Union was a strategic partner. New oil was being brought on line until it peaked at just under 600,000 b/d in 1996. Today, production has fallen just under 400,000 b/d.

The Soviet Union is of course no longer. The population is now higher by almost four fold. As of last year, the Syrian government’s bill for total subsidies was close to USD$ 8 billion. This amounts to USD$ 355 for every man, woman and child. For an average family, this is close to USD$ 2000 a year. What started as a perfectly honorable and humane government program that may have cost less than USD$ 2 billion a year, when it was first initiated 40 years ago, will end up bankrupting the state. If subsidies are not cut the bill will rise to $30 billion in 40 years.

Subsidies distort the efficient allocation of resources. They work by robbing from Peter to pay Paul. The Peters in this case are government hospitals, universities, roads and municipalities. They are underfunded and in disrepair. The Syrian public is constantly griping about the decline in state services. The Syrian government is not a magician. It cannot be expected to subsidize the population to the tune of USD$ 8 billion at the same time as it provides quality health-care and education. It must either raise taxes, borrow, or print money. The political pressure on the Syrian government to continue subsidies is immense following the Egyptian uprising. It would be wise for the leadership to resist such pressure and stick to its guns on cutting subsidies. The short term pain will be great; it is imperative to begin impressing on the public that they will be better off in the long run for the added pain in the short run.

A culture of dependency on the state has developed in Syria over the past several decades that will be hard to reverse. While the subsidies help many needy Syrians, they also fatten the pockets of smugglers. When you sell heating oil at prices that are less than a third of what they are in neighboring countries, you invite illicit trade. Syrian taxis travel with a full tank of gas to Turkey, empty the gas right across the border and return for an encore. While there is no denying that the poor is being helped by the subsidies, the fact is that the rich and powerful are also benefiting. The government must communicate to the public that what it is doing is not an assault on the poor or that it is deaf to their predicament. The arithmetic of falling oil revenues and increased population has combined to make these subsidies unaffordable.

The High cost of housing and the need for more education reform:

Arabs have generated much of their wealth from asset price booms. Think of real estate or oil. In contrast to East Asian countries that have built industries and knowledge-based services, Arabs have counted on scarcity. Asset-based booms do not depend on human capital inputs. They do not indicate a real rise in competitiveness, education or social organization. This is best illustrated by the ratio of the price of a house to annual income. The average house price/income ration in the US is 3. It went up to 4 during the real estate boom but dropped back to 3 when the sector lost close to 25% following the 2006 collapse. Syria and the rest of the Arab world have ratios approaching 10. In other words, it takes close to ten years of wages for the average Syrian to buy his house. This is made worse by weak credit markets that leave many of the youth unable to access financing.

Youth also face the challenge of overcoming an outmoded education system, that values memorization over all else. Critical thinking, working in groups, sports, arts, and personal leadership qualities all have zero bearing on a young student’s prospect of success in high school or university. When they graduate, Syrian students often find that they lack the skills they need to find a meaningful job.

Conclusion:

Syria, like the rest of the Arab world, can no longer afford to live without a serious family planning campaign. Also, it must deliver high growth rates. Only by pursuing both policies together can it hope to raise incomes and create the jobs that young Syrians count on to give dignity and meaning to their lives

الجمعة، 23 يوليو 2010

Syria and the niqab : Take it off


A secular-minded government rejects excessively religious dress in school
Jul 15th 2010 | DAMASCUS


AS MEMBERS of France’s parliament voted to outlaw the public wearing of the niqab, the Muslim facial veil that exposes just the eyes, Syria is quietly imposing its own curbs. A number of teachers who wear the niqab in schoolhave been transferred to other jobs. The government’s action, so far ordered only orally, has been shrouded in secrecy. But it has been confirmed by civil-society groups that have been approached by some of the 1,200-odd teachers said to have been affected. Ali Saad, the education minister, is reported to have told teachers that the niqab undermines the “objective, secular methodology” of Syria’s schools.

Religious radicals have long been the biggest threat to Syria’s Baathist government and its secular socialism. The crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood in the town of Hama in 1982, when more than 10,000 of its followers were killed, has not been forgotten. More recently, however, the government has sought to curry favour at home by rallying to the cry of Islam. Indeed, in an effort to emulate neighbouring Turkey, President Bashar Assad’s government has posed as a regional champion of moderate Islam. Enthusiasm for shows of religiosity has grown. In the past few years more women have been wearing the veil. Religious books are selling better. More religious schools are being set up.

Yet the government is still very wary of Muslim fundamentalism, especially in education. Last year it reviewed its regulations for Islamic schools. One committee was set up to monitor their funding; another looked at the curriculum. Many of the foreigners who fetch up in Syrian jails are radicals who have been involved in religious schools. Seeking ways to curb the niqab in places of education illustrates the government’s twitchiness.

The reaction of Syrians has been mixed. “The niqab is a Wahhabi way of influencing Syria and is a form of violence against women,” says Bassam al-Kadi, the outspoken head of the Syrian Women’s Observatory, a lobby that strongly supports the curb. But some say it is an attack on personal freedom