The killing of Iraq’s bloodiest terrorist leader will boost the new government of Nuri al-Maliki—but not necessarily for long
Jun 8th 2006
ON JUNE 7th, American troops killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the self-proclaimed boss of al-Qaeda in Iraq, in an airstrike near the central town of Baquba. Tracking Mr Zarqawi after locating and following his “spiritual advisor”, American forces found the arch-insurgent himself holed up in an obscure hut, hidden by palm trees, and dropped two bombs on it. His remains were identified by sight and by finger-prints. Iraqi and American leaders celebrated the victory, with George Bush in particular hailing a potential turning point. But it is not clear what effect this will have on the insurgency and sectarian war boiling in Iraq.
Mr Zarqawi’s death will not end the terrible violence, nor perhaps will it even reduce it by much. Though an important cheerleader for Islamist militants in Iraq, and everywhere, Mr Zarqawi probably orchestrated only a small portion of the war. But this was, by a long chalk, America’s single biggest victory in nearly five years of fighting Islamist terror.
With a $25m bounty on his head, Mr Zarqawi was identified by America as its main enemy in Iraq shortly after it invaded the country three years ago. Most analysts felt this exaggerated his importance: the insurgency from the start was more indigenous and more popular than the Americans admitted. But, perhaps partly as a product of the publicity he received, Mr Zarqawi succeeded in bringing the al-Qaeda brand to Iraq, making the insurgents a source of inspiration elsewhere.
He was behind the only efforts yet to export the violence in Iraq around its region. In November last year, suicide bombers attacked three hotels in Jordan, Mr Zarqawi’s homeland, on his instructions, killing some 60 people. More recently, he had planned attacks on Eilat, Israel’s Red Sea port and resort. If his death does not much disrupt the insurgents in Iraq, who are organised in many small groups responsible for their own recruiting, supplies and planning, it will dismay their fellow-travellers elsewhere.
One reason Mr Zarqawi was successful in Iraq was because he started early. He moved there two years before America invaded, to join a local Islamist group, al-Ansar al-Islam, in order to plot the overthrow of Jordan’s government next door. His previous history was not unlike many current jihadists. A middle-class drifter, he found meaning in the Islamist guerrilla war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, to drive out the Soviet Union. But, unlike Osama bin Laden, Mr Zarqawi was a very peripheral figure in that war. He arrived in Afghanistan in 1990, after the Russians had withdrawn, and founded a training-camp there to prepare guerrillas for a similar struggle in Jordan. Returning home, he was arrested for murder and jailed for eight years, after which he made his break for Iraq.
Mr Zarqawi’s signature violence was the kidnapping and beheading of westerners in Iraq. He is believed personally to have sliced off the head of Nicholas Berg, an American engineer killed in 2004. As his fame grew, he made several well-publicised contacts with Mr bin Laden and his number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who are believed to be hiding in the mountains along the Afghan-Pakistan border. In a letter intercepted by Americans last year, Mr Zarqawi pledged fealty to Mr bin Laden. He also renamed his movement “al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers”, or al-Qaeda in Iraq, and so capitalised on its global brand.
What contribution he made to the insurgency is unclear: America’s understanding of it has always been very limited. But, in internet postings and in a couple of recent videos, he sold himself as a well-organised enemy of Arab governments, America and Israel. He was helpful, at least, in recruiting several hundred young Muslims into Iraq, mostly through Syria, to become suicide attackers. Initially their target was American and Iraqi troops. But over the past year or so, the blasts have mostly been directed at Iraq civilians, especially those of the Shia majority, in an effort to stoke a civil war.
This effort has been hideously and dazzlingly successful. Most of the violence in Iraq is now sectarian; and most Sunni insurgent groups are Islamist. Mr Zarqawi’s death will not deter them; indeed, having achieved martyrdom, the supposed ambition of all jihadist militants, he may have inspired them more by his death. But it may also be a blow to those in Iraq, especially the small minority of foreign militants, intent on exporting terror around the region and the world. It may also boost the fledgling government of Nuri al-Maliki, Iraq’s new prime minister, which has made tentative efforts to reach out to Sunnis and draw them back from the Islamist margins.
It is certainly a great and painfully rare victory for American intelligence efforts in Iraq; indeed, the Jordanians have been quick to take some of the credit for tracking Mr Zarqawi down. In any event, Mr Maliki, who this week at last managed to appoint new ministers of interior and defence, the latter a Sunni Arab, was understandably jubilant
Jun 8th 2006
ON JUNE 7th, American troops killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the self-proclaimed boss of al-Qaeda in Iraq, in an airstrike near the central town of Baquba. Tracking Mr Zarqawi after locating and following his “spiritual advisor”, American forces found the arch-insurgent himself holed up in an obscure hut, hidden by palm trees, and dropped two bombs on it. His remains were identified by sight and by finger-prints. Iraqi and American leaders celebrated the victory, with George Bush in particular hailing a potential turning point. But it is not clear what effect this will have on the insurgency and sectarian war boiling in Iraq.
Mr Zarqawi’s death will not end the terrible violence, nor perhaps will it even reduce it by much. Though an important cheerleader for Islamist militants in Iraq, and everywhere, Mr Zarqawi probably orchestrated only a small portion of the war. But this was, by a long chalk, America’s single biggest victory in nearly five years of fighting Islamist terror.
With a $25m bounty on his head, Mr Zarqawi was identified by America as its main enemy in Iraq shortly after it invaded the country three years ago. Most analysts felt this exaggerated his importance: the insurgency from the start was more indigenous and more popular than the Americans admitted. But, perhaps partly as a product of the publicity he received, Mr Zarqawi succeeded in bringing the al-Qaeda brand to Iraq, making the insurgents a source of inspiration elsewhere.
He was behind the only efforts yet to export the violence in Iraq around its region. In November last year, suicide bombers attacked three hotels in Jordan, Mr Zarqawi’s homeland, on his instructions, killing some 60 people. More recently, he had planned attacks on Eilat, Israel’s Red Sea port and resort. If his death does not much disrupt the insurgents in Iraq, who are organised in many small groups responsible for their own recruiting, supplies and planning, it will dismay their fellow-travellers elsewhere.
One reason Mr Zarqawi was successful in Iraq was because he started early. He moved there two years before America invaded, to join a local Islamist group, al-Ansar al-Islam, in order to plot the overthrow of Jordan’s government next door. His previous history was not unlike many current jihadists. A middle-class drifter, he found meaning in the Islamist guerrilla war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, to drive out the Soviet Union. But, unlike Osama bin Laden, Mr Zarqawi was a very peripheral figure in that war. He arrived in Afghanistan in 1990, after the Russians had withdrawn, and founded a training-camp there to prepare guerrillas for a similar struggle in Jordan. Returning home, he was arrested for murder and jailed for eight years, after which he made his break for Iraq.
Mr Zarqawi’s signature violence was the kidnapping and beheading of westerners in Iraq. He is believed personally to have sliced off the head of Nicholas Berg, an American engineer killed in 2004. As his fame grew, he made several well-publicised contacts with Mr bin Laden and his number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who are believed to be hiding in the mountains along the Afghan-Pakistan border. In a letter intercepted by Americans last year, Mr Zarqawi pledged fealty to Mr bin Laden. He also renamed his movement “al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers”, or al-Qaeda in Iraq, and so capitalised on its global brand.
What contribution he made to the insurgency is unclear: America’s understanding of it has always been very limited. But, in internet postings and in a couple of recent videos, he sold himself as a well-organised enemy of Arab governments, America and Israel. He was helpful, at least, in recruiting several hundred young Muslims into Iraq, mostly through Syria, to become suicide attackers. Initially their target was American and Iraqi troops. But over the past year or so, the blasts have mostly been directed at Iraq civilians, especially those of the Shia majority, in an effort to stoke a civil war.
This effort has been hideously and dazzlingly successful. Most of the violence in Iraq is now sectarian; and most Sunni insurgent groups are Islamist. Mr Zarqawi’s death will not deter them; indeed, having achieved martyrdom, the supposed ambition of all jihadist militants, he may have inspired them more by his death. But it may also be a blow to those in Iraq, especially the small minority of foreign militants, intent on exporting terror around the region and the world. It may also boost the fledgling government of Nuri al-Maliki, Iraq’s new prime minister, which has made tentative efforts to reach out to Sunnis and draw them back from the Islamist margins.
It is certainly a great and painfully rare victory for American intelligence efforts in Iraq; indeed, the Jordanians have been quick to take some of the credit for tracking Mr Zarqawi down. In any event, Mr Maliki, who this week at last managed to appoint new ministers of interior and defence, the latter a Sunni Arab, was understandably jubilant
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