Saudi Arabia tackles terrorism with a mixture of tough policing and gentle re-education
Jul 17th 2008
YOUSUF AL-AYEERI, al-Qaeda’s ex-leader in Saudi Arabia, was not ready when the order came to open a new front in the land of Mecca and Medina. He had told his commanders, in a letter written in the coded language of a football coach, that his “teams” were not yet strong enough; they could play some away games in neighbouring countries, but it would be best to wait six months to build up a fan base in Saudi Arabia, particularly among religious authorities.
But according to Saudi security sources, Seif al-Adel, a senior al-Qaeda leader in Iran, insisted that the time was ripe to take on the House of Saud. Saudi Arabia’s relations with America, its main protector, were badly strained after the September 11th attacks (15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis), and America’s invasion of Iraq in March 2003 had riled Muslims. For Osama bin Laden, one of al-Qaeda’s main aims had always been to depose the “tyrants” who had let American troops into his native country in 1991. In April 2003 the Americans announced their intention to leave. Yet on May 12th 2003 three suicide squads set off car-bombs in Western residential compounds, killing 26 people. It was the start of the most serious al-Qaeda campaign outside Iraq, targeting Western compounds, Saudi police offices and oil installations.
Within two years, however, the Saudi authorities seemed to have got a firm grip on the militants. Their policy mixed hard-nosed security operations and an extensive deradicalisation programme in the prisons with social measures for the families of militants. These days, Saudi Arabia, often considered the fount of hardline ideology and finance for jihadists, is seen by many as a model for fighting terrorism.
After the downfall of the Taliban, the Saudis had been on the lookout for al-Qaeda veterans returning from Afghanistan. When explosives were accidentally set off in Riyadh in May 2003, say Saudi officials, security forces found a vast cache of weapons. The interior ministry put out a list of 19 wanted men. But a few days later the first suicide car-bombs exploded.
Initially, the militants seemed to enjoy a degree of public backing. “When the attacks started, the mosques were almost supporting them. We could not arrest 35,000 imams,” said a Saudi security source. But the police and the national guard carried out hundreds of raids and learnt fast. They killed Ayeeri within a month of the attacks and three more leaders within the next two years.
Al-Qaeda, for its part, was bumping off ever more Muslims. A lorry-bomb in Riyadh in November 2003 killed mostly Muslim expatriates. When the militants struck a building used mainly by the Saudi traffic police in April 2004, the dead included a child.
For the past three years, al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia appears to have become increasingly fragmented, with no clear leadership or methodology. Alms-giving and money transfers, the main sources of terrorist funding, have been restricted to the point where some Western diplomats say it could drive all charitable donations underground and become counterproductive. Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad), one the best-known jihadi online magazines, disappeared for more than two years. “They underestimated the Saudi police,” says a senior security source. “But we are fortunate they started prematurely. If they had listened to Ayeeri maybe they would be in a different position.”
Although fragmented, al-Qaeda is still active. A twin car-bomb attack on Saudi Arabia’s main oil-processing facility at Abqaiq was only narrowly averted in February 2006, and militants have made at least five other attempts to strike at the oil infrastructure. Security sources say a Saudi general was killed at his home by some of his own tribesmen last year when they returned from Iraq.
The war of ideas
As the centre of Muslim pilgrimage, Saudi Arabia will always be a place for extremists from across the world to meet and plot, sometimes carrying secret messages. Still, the level of violence has dropped, and the country can put more effort into the war of ideas. Official propaganda talks of extremists as “misguided” or deviant. It avoids terms such as jihadi or irhabi (Arabic for “terrorist”) because they are derived from Koranic verses with positive connotations. Saudi officials note that Sura 8:60 commands the faithful to “strike terror into the enemies of Allah”. Saudi Arabia treats jihadists as victims rather than as terrorists. Jailed militants are offered one-on-one discussions with Islamic scholars to try to convince them that they have misinterpreted the rules of jihad.
Those due for release after serving short sentences for, say, fighting in Iraq undergo rehabilitation in a low-security holiday camp outside Riyadh. Other inmates have served time at Guantánamo Bay. The young men spend their days in religious discussions, art therapy, sports, vocational training and psychological assessments.
One of those who recently attended the course was 30-year-old Abdallah al-Sufyani, a lovelorn former university student from Taif. He decided to go to Iraq in 2003 after his secret girlfriend was made to marry another man. He wanted to die, but believed he would go to hell if he committed suicide. His answer was to fight the Americans and hope he would be killed as a martyr. But he survived and eventually returned home. “I did not find the truth in Iraq,” he says. “I found Muslims killing Muslims, Iraqis killing Iraqis.” Now, with the help of the Saudi government, he hopes to write a book and launch a poetry magazine.
Inmates on rehabilitation are encouraged to reconnect with friends and family on frequent home visits. When they leave, the state gives them money if they have no job, helps them find work, buys them a car and even assists them in finding a wife. Family members are looked after too, to ensure they are not recruited by extremists. Friends, relatives and tribal elders are enlisted to ensure good behaviour. The system of subsidy and patronage is so generous that Saudis quip they wish they had been in Tora Bora with Osama bin Laden.
The rate of recidivism is not known. Two former Guantánamo inmates are back in prison, but even that may be a sign of progress. “Do you know who told us about them? Their friends,” says a senior Saudi source.
As for the hardcore militants, the government has a different plan. About 700 people are currently in jail pending prosecution on terrorism-related charges. Five new high-security prisons for militants, with room for thousands, are being built by none other than the bin Laden family’s construction firm.
Some 75 people involved in the explosions in 2003 are due to be tried this year. The government wants them to be dealt with by the sternest of Wahhabi religious scholars. “It should not be a trial of the people,” says a senior Saudi figure, “it should be a trial of the ideology of al-Qaeda. The real victory over al-Qaeda will be when we defeat the ideology.”
Jul 17th 2008
YOUSUF AL-AYEERI, al-Qaeda’s ex-leader in Saudi Arabia, was not ready when the order came to open a new front in the land of Mecca and Medina. He had told his commanders, in a letter written in the coded language of a football coach, that his “teams” were not yet strong enough; they could play some away games in neighbouring countries, but it would be best to wait six months to build up a fan base in Saudi Arabia, particularly among religious authorities.
But according to Saudi security sources, Seif al-Adel, a senior al-Qaeda leader in Iran, insisted that the time was ripe to take on the House of Saud. Saudi Arabia’s relations with America, its main protector, were badly strained after the September 11th attacks (15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis), and America’s invasion of Iraq in March 2003 had riled Muslims. For Osama bin Laden, one of al-Qaeda’s main aims had always been to depose the “tyrants” who had let American troops into his native country in 1991. In April 2003 the Americans announced their intention to leave. Yet on May 12th 2003 three suicide squads set off car-bombs in Western residential compounds, killing 26 people. It was the start of the most serious al-Qaeda campaign outside Iraq, targeting Western compounds, Saudi police offices and oil installations.
Within two years, however, the Saudi authorities seemed to have got a firm grip on the militants. Their policy mixed hard-nosed security operations and an extensive deradicalisation programme in the prisons with social measures for the families of militants. These days, Saudi Arabia, often considered the fount of hardline ideology and finance for jihadists, is seen by many as a model for fighting terrorism.
After the downfall of the Taliban, the Saudis had been on the lookout for al-Qaeda veterans returning from Afghanistan. When explosives were accidentally set off in Riyadh in May 2003, say Saudi officials, security forces found a vast cache of weapons. The interior ministry put out a list of 19 wanted men. But a few days later the first suicide car-bombs exploded.
Initially, the militants seemed to enjoy a degree of public backing. “When the attacks started, the mosques were almost supporting them. We could not arrest 35,000 imams,” said a Saudi security source. But the police and the national guard carried out hundreds of raids and learnt fast. They killed Ayeeri within a month of the attacks and three more leaders within the next two years.
Al-Qaeda, for its part, was bumping off ever more Muslims. A lorry-bomb in Riyadh in November 2003 killed mostly Muslim expatriates. When the militants struck a building used mainly by the Saudi traffic police in April 2004, the dead included a child.
For the past three years, al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia appears to have become increasingly fragmented, with no clear leadership or methodology. Alms-giving and money transfers, the main sources of terrorist funding, have been restricted to the point where some Western diplomats say it could drive all charitable donations underground and become counterproductive. Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad), one the best-known jihadi online magazines, disappeared for more than two years. “They underestimated the Saudi police,” says a senior security source. “But we are fortunate they started prematurely. If they had listened to Ayeeri maybe they would be in a different position.”
Although fragmented, al-Qaeda is still active. A twin car-bomb attack on Saudi Arabia’s main oil-processing facility at Abqaiq was only narrowly averted in February 2006, and militants have made at least five other attempts to strike at the oil infrastructure. Security sources say a Saudi general was killed at his home by some of his own tribesmen last year when they returned from Iraq.
The war of ideas
As the centre of Muslim pilgrimage, Saudi Arabia will always be a place for extremists from across the world to meet and plot, sometimes carrying secret messages. Still, the level of violence has dropped, and the country can put more effort into the war of ideas. Official propaganda talks of extremists as “misguided” or deviant. It avoids terms such as jihadi or irhabi (Arabic for “terrorist”) because they are derived from Koranic verses with positive connotations. Saudi officials note that Sura 8:60 commands the faithful to “strike terror into the enemies of Allah”. Saudi Arabia treats jihadists as victims rather than as terrorists. Jailed militants are offered one-on-one discussions with Islamic scholars to try to convince them that they have misinterpreted the rules of jihad.
Those due for release after serving short sentences for, say, fighting in Iraq undergo rehabilitation in a low-security holiday camp outside Riyadh. Other inmates have served time at Guantánamo Bay. The young men spend their days in religious discussions, art therapy, sports, vocational training and psychological assessments.
One of those who recently attended the course was 30-year-old Abdallah al-Sufyani, a lovelorn former university student from Taif. He decided to go to Iraq in 2003 after his secret girlfriend was made to marry another man. He wanted to die, but believed he would go to hell if he committed suicide. His answer was to fight the Americans and hope he would be killed as a martyr. But he survived and eventually returned home. “I did not find the truth in Iraq,” he says. “I found Muslims killing Muslims, Iraqis killing Iraqis.” Now, with the help of the Saudi government, he hopes to write a book and launch a poetry magazine.
Inmates on rehabilitation are encouraged to reconnect with friends and family on frequent home visits. When they leave, the state gives them money if they have no job, helps them find work, buys them a car and even assists them in finding a wife. Family members are looked after too, to ensure they are not recruited by extremists. Friends, relatives and tribal elders are enlisted to ensure good behaviour. The system of subsidy and patronage is so generous that Saudis quip they wish they had been in Tora Bora with Osama bin Laden.
The rate of recidivism is not known. Two former Guantánamo inmates are back in prison, but even that may be a sign of progress. “Do you know who told us about them? Their friends,” says a senior Saudi source.
As for the hardcore militants, the government has a different plan. About 700 people are currently in jail pending prosecution on terrorism-related charges. Five new high-security prisons for militants, with room for thousands, are being built by none other than the bin Laden family’s construction firm.
Some 75 people involved in the explosions in 2003 are due to be tried this year. The government wants them to be dealt with by the sternest of Wahhabi religious scholars. “It should not be a trial of the people,” says a senior Saudi figure, “it should be a trial of the ideology of al-Qaeda. The real victory over al-Qaeda will be when we defeat the ideology.”
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