As President Bush talks of withdrawing some troops, Iraqis are airing the prospect of negotiation between the government and some—but not all—insurgents
Dec 1st 2005
UNTIL recently, most Iraqis—Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs and Kurds—said they wanted a negotiated end to the insurgency, but none seemed to know with whom the Iraqi government or its American backers should or could negotiate. The Americans said they were willing to talk to intermediaries but would not speak directly to gunmen or bombers; in any event, it was for Iraq's government to negotiate the terms of a truce. The Shia-led government, for its part, said it would happily accept a ceasefire with the insurgents but would never forgive acts of violence insurgents had committed against civilians—thus virtually ruling out negotiations. So, with a general election on December 15th, talk of negotiation is in the air. But nothing tangible is in the offing. Or is it?
With pressure building in Iraq and in the United States for some sort of deal to let foreign forces start withdrawing as Iraqi forces gather strength, more overtures are being made. At a recent conference in Cairo, hosted by the Arab League and attended by Iraqis close to the insurgency as well as by Iraqi government representatives, a “right to resistance” against occupying foreign forces was controversially recognised. Iraq's president, Jalal Talabani, said he was ready to speak to any Iraqis, even those bearing arms. And America's ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, said Americans could talk to any insurgents except extreme Islamists or former loyalists of Saddam Hussein; Mr Khalilzad also said that Mr Bush had given him permission to “open a dialogue” with Iran, which has a (debatable) degree of influence over Iraq's main Islamist Shia parties, over how best to bring stability to the country.
Will any insurgent groups respond to such overtures? And if they did, would they have the clout to make a difference in the country at large? At least four groups—the Iraqi Islamic Army, the 1920 Revolution Group, the Mujahideen Army and the al-Jamaa Brigades—may be preparing delegations to meet Mr Talabani. Despite their Islamist names, they probably represent members of Mr Hussein's army, intelligence service and formerly ruling Baath party. The Americans have long hoped to split such “nationalist” guerrillas from the jihadists who follow such leaders as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the proclaimed leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, who is thought to hate Iraq's Shia majority as apostates and wants to turn Iraq into a puritan Sunni state. By contrast, many Iraqis say that the nationalist insurgents above all want an amnesty, an investigation into recent human-rights abuses, the political rehabilitation of former Baathists and the rebuilding of the old Iraqi army: a guarantee, in other words, that Iraq's former ruling minority will have a secure place in a new and multi-sectarian Iraq.
A lot of Kurds, who have been comparatively safe in their self-ruling northern zone, are probably ready to discuss such demands. So are many in the American administration. But they are unlikely to get the Islamist Shia parties who now dominate Iraq's government to agree—especially the Iran-backed Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), whose bitter hatred of Iraq's old Sunni-led army and ruling party goes back to the eight-year war with Iran which started in 1980 and left perhaps 1m Iraqi and Iranian dead. SCIRI officials sometimes say that the Baathists see negotiations as a tactical ploy to get the Americans out—after which they will try to recover their old place as Iraq's top dogs.
The Shias are particularly twitchy about the prospect of direct talks between the Americans and the insurgents. Some Shias, mindful of Britain's supposed colonial preference for Sunni Arab rulers, suspect that the West is always willing to cut a deal at their expense. Shia leaders also resent the idea that representatives of the superpower might talk directly to Baathist leaders, while overriding the wishes of Iraq's new establishment, which the insurgents denounce as American puppets.
Shia leaders are also infuriated by the Americans' apparent concern to embrace more Iraqi Sunnis and by the growing number of reports in the American press about human-rights abuses committed by their co-religionists in such places as the interior ministry. SCIRI's leader, Abdelaziz al-Hakim, has lashed out at the Americans for reining in the Iraqi security forces during a recent counter-insurgency offensive, saying that American “mistakes” have “cost us dearly”. Indeed, most Shia leaders are reluctant, at present, to contemplate negotiating with the insurgents, for the simple reason that, as a national majority of around 60% to the Sunnis' 20% or so, they think they can win; the rougher the methods, the better.
However, the influence of Shia hardliners may be waning. The Sunni Arab minority, which generally boycotted the last general election in January, is expected to vote in large numbers in the coming election. This should water down the Islamist parties' dominance in government. Politicians like the former interim prime minister, Iyad Allawi, a secular-minded Shia, are courting Iraqi voters who are tired of the new rulers' sectarian zeal, which, they argue, is exacerbating the conflict. Many Iraqi politicians want to improve their government's human-rights reputation by ousting the interior minister, Bayan Jaber, a SCIRI man widely accused of winking an eye at Shia death squads targeting prominent Sunnis. All the same, a pretty tough-minded lot of Shias are still likely to be in charge of the next government.
Even if talks began with some insurgent factions, the violence would not subside fast. The insurgents are fractious. One western intelligence service is said to have counted no less than 74 named guerrilla groups. Drawing a line between nationalists and Islamists is not easy. The Americans, in particular, are hoping to divide the indigenous groups, Islamist or nationalist, from the foreign-led ones, such as Mr Zarqawi's. But some experts, such as Toby Dodge of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, reckon that the extreme jihadists are themselves being indigenised: Mr Zarqawi's insurgents may have increased from “the low hundreds to the low thousands” in the past eight months or so, many of them home-grown.
Moreover, even secular-minded guerrillas may be wary of reining in the fanatics, let alone betraying them to the Americans. If real progress is to be made, interlocutors for the insurgents must prove that they can stop violence in specific areas for a set length of time—for instance, by promising not to set off roadside bombs, the insurgents' main weapon, in a certain district for, say, a week. So far, there is no evidence that individual groups have the clout to switch off the insurgency, even in limited areas. That is what the more flexible members of the government may, experimentally, be hoping for. But it is not clear how much influence, after December 15th, they will have
Dec 1st 2005
UNTIL recently, most Iraqis—Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs and Kurds—said they wanted a negotiated end to the insurgency, but none seemed to know with whom the Iraqi government or its American backers should or could negotiate. The Americans said they were willing to talk to intermediaries but would not speak directly to gunmen or bombers; in any event, it was for Iraq's government to negotiate the terms of a truce. The Shia-led government, for its part, said it would happily accept a ceasefire with the insurgents but would never forgive acts of violence insurgents had committed against civilians—thus virtually ruling out negotiations. So, with a general election on December 15th, talk of negotiation is in the air. But nothing tangible is in the offing. Or is it?
With pressure building in Iraq and in the United States for some sort of deal to let foreign forces start withdrawing as Iraqi forces gather strength, more overtures are being made. At a recent conference in Cairo, hosted by the Arab League and attended by Iraqis close to the insurgency as well as by Iraqi government representatives, a “right to resistance” against occupying foreign forces was controversially recognised. Iraq's president, Jalal Talabani, said he was ready to speak to any Iraqis, even those bearing arms. And America's ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, said Americans could talk to any insurgents except extreme Islamists or former loyalists of Saddam Hussein; Mr Khalilzad also said that Mr Bush had given him permission to “open a dialogue” with Iran, which has a (debatable) degree of influence over Iraq's main Islamist Shia parties, over how best to bring stability to the country.
Will any insurgent groups respond to such overtures? And if they did, would they have the clout to make a difference in the country at large? At least four groups—the Iraqi Islamic Army, the 1920 Revolution Group, the Mujahideen Army and the al-Jamaa Brigades—may be preparing delegations to meet Mr Talabani. Despite their Islamist names, they probably represent members of Mr Hussein's army, intelligence service and formerly ruling Baath party. The Americans have long hoped to split such “nationalist” guerrillas from the jihadists who follow such leaders as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the proclaimed leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, who is thought to hate Iraq's Shia majority as apostates and wants to turn Iraq into a puritan Sunni state. By contrast, many Iraqis say that the nationalist insurgents above all want an amnesty, an investigation into recent human-rights abuses, the political rehabilitation of former Baathists and the rebuilding of the old Iraqi army: a guarantee, in other words, that Iraq's former ruling minority will have a secure place in a new and multi-sectarian Iraq.
A lot of Kurds, who have been comparatively safe in their self-ruling northern zone, are probably ready to discuss such demands. So are many in the American administration. But they are unlikely to get the Islamist Shia parties who now dominate Iraq's government to agree—especially the Iran-backed Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), whose bitter hatred of Iraq's old Sunni-led army and ruling party goes back to the eight-year war with Iran which started in 1980 and left perhaps 1m Iraqi and Iranian dead. SCIRI officials sometimes say that the Baathists see negotiations as a tactical ploy to get the Americans out—after which they will try to recover their old place as Iraq's top dogs.
The Shias are particularly twitchy about the prospect of direct talks between the Americans and the insurgents. Some Shias, mindful of Britain's supposed colonial preference for Sunni Arab rulers, suspect that the West is always willing to cut a deal at their expense. Shia leaders also resent the idea that representatives of the superpower might talk directly to Baathist leaders, while overriding the wishes of Iraq's new establishment, which the insurgents denounce as American puppets.
Shia leaders are also infuriated by the Americans' apparent concern to embrace more Iraqi Sunnis and by the growing number of reports in the American press about human-rights abuses committed by their co-religionists in such places as the interior ministry. SCIRI's leader, Abdelaziz al-Hakim, has lashed out at the Americans for reining in the Iraqi security forces during a recent counter-insurgency offensive, saying that American “mistakes” have “cost us dearly”. Indeed, most Shia leaders are reluctant, at present, to contemplate negotiating with the insurgents, for the simple reason that, as a national majority of around 60% to the Sunnis' 20% or so, they think they can win; the rougher the methods, the better.
However, the influence of Shia hardliners may be waning. The Sunni Arab minority, which generally boycotted the last general election in January, is expected to vote in large numbers in the coming election. This should water down the Islamist parties' dominance in government. Politicians like the former interim prime minister, Iyad Allawi, a secular-minded Shia, are courting Iraqi voters who are tired of the new rulers' sectarian zeal, which, they argue, is exacerbating the conflict. Many Iraqi politicians want to improve their government's human-rights reputation by ousting the interior minister, Bayan Jaber, a SCIRI man widely accused of winking an eye at Shia death squads targeting prominent Sunnis. All the same, a pretty tough-minded lot of Shias are still likely to be in charge of the next government.
Even if talks began with some insurgent factions, the violence would not subside fast. The insurgents are fractious. One western intelligence service is said to have counted no less than 74 named guerrilla groups. Drawing a line between nationalists and Islamists is not easy. The Americans, in particular, are hoping to divide the indigenous groups, Islamist or nationalist, from the foreign-led ones, such as Mr Zarqawi's. But some experts, such as Toby Dodge of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, reckon that the extreme jihadists are themselves being indigenised: Mr Zarqawi's insurgents may have increased from “the low hundreds to the low thousands” in the past eight months or so, many of them home-grown.
Moreover, even secular-minded guerrillas may be wary of reining in the fanatics, let alone betraying them to the Americans. If real progress is to be made, interlocutors for the insurgents must prove that they can stop violence in specific areas for a set length of time—for instance, by promising not to set off roadside bombs, the insurgents' main weapon, in a certain district for, say, a week. So far, there is no evidence that individual groups have the clout to switch off the insurgency, even in limited areas. That is what the more flexible members of the government may, experimentally, be hoping for. But it is not clear how much influence, after December 15th, they will have
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