Oct 7th 1999
SO FAR, the Russians have had the easiest part of their new war against Chechnya. Since the ground offensive started on October 1st, the Kremlin’s forces, some 30,000 strong, have moved from the neighbouring republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia, and from Russia’s Stavropol region, to seize the most accessible and least-defended part of Chechnya, its northern third. The Russians have also shown their ability to bomb civilian and economic targets (such as oil refineries) in the capital Grozny at will. These achievements are not surprising, given Russia’s huge superiority in men, armour and aircraft.
The big question is what happens next. Russia’s first claim, to be establishing just a buffer zone, seems not to be the full story. By mid-week, Russian forces had taken up positions along the Terek river, and some were within artillery range of Grozny. But a Russian attempt to stop the war by declaring victory now would not work. It would give the Chechens a chance to regroup and harry the occupying soldiers. That in effect would repeat the history of the 1994-96 war, when Russian soldiers bloodily conquered Chechnya, only to see guerrillas stealthily retake the country once victory had been declared.
Pushing the offensive further—which Russian officials do not exclude—looks unattractive too. The Chechens are already celebrating the shooting down of at least two Russian aircraft, and claim to have destroyed half a dozen armoured vehicles and captured several Russian soldiers. Russia says only two of its men have been killed, and 22 wounded. Even if true—and the Chechens claim to have killed dozens of Russians—that total would rise sharply should the fighting become hand-to-hand in Chechnya’s towns, let alone mountain warfare. In that sort of conflict, the gritty Chechens excel. The riskiest part of Russia’s immediate plan will be to establish control over Chechnya’s border with Georgia. This has yet to begin.
Both sides seem to think time is on their side. Russia is backing up its military offensive with economic warfare—for example, by cutting back gas and electricity supplies. It has also indicated that it will resettle refugees in the Russian-controlled sector of Chechnya, whether or not they came from there originally. This zone will presumably be well supplied with energy and utilities, to make the point that life under Russia is better.
On the Chechen side, internal squabbles have been set aside. Shamil Basaev, the best-known Chechen warlord, has sarcastically said he is “very grateful” to Russia for creating a new sense of unity among his people. His erstwhile rival, President Aslan Maskhadov, has called on Chechnya’s religious leaders to rally the nation to holy war, “to defend the [country’s] sovereignty and integrity in the name of Allah the benevolent and merciful.” Martial law has been declared in Grozny, although it is not clear who will enforce it.
Over the next few months, it is likely that the combination of winter and Russia’s endemic military disorganisation will hurt the invading forces more than the defenders, although the greatest misery is now borne by the 120,000 refugees.
So far there is no sign of a political compromise between Russia and Chechnya’s leadership. Russia has dusted down the collaborationist Chechen parliament which it used in the previous war, and partly withdrawn its grudging recognition of the Chechen government and president. The Russian side has so far provided no evidence of the terrorist training camps that the war is meant to destroy.
The most worrying thought is that the war may be a prelude to a wider conflict. Russia has denied Azerbaijani claims that its air force bombed a village in Azerbaijan on October 1st, although it has admitted bombing villages in Georgia last month, and has increased the number of soldiers based there. Russia has warned Azerbaijan not to allow aid to Chechnya to cross its territory. In Shia Muslim (but not very devout) Azerbaijan, and in Orthodox Christian Georgia, people are united in hoping against hope that their hard-won modicum of stability, and independence from Russia, are not about to be forfeited
SO FAR, the Russians have had the easiest part of their new war against Chechnya. Since the ground offensive started on October 1st, the Kremlin’s forces, some 30,000 strong, have moved from the neighbouring republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia, and from Russia’s Stavropol region, to seize the most accessible and least-defended part of Chechnya, its northern third. The Russians have also shown their ability to bomb civilian and economic targets (such as oil refineries) in the capital Grozny at will. These achievements are not surprising, given Russia’s huge superiority in men, armour and aircraft.
The big question is what happens next. Russia’s first claim, to be establishing just a buffer zone, seems not to be the full story. By mid-week, Russian forces had taken up positions along the Terek river, and some were within artillery range of Grozny. But a Russian attempt to stop the war by declaring victory now would not work. It would give the Chechens a chance to regroup and harry the occupying soldiers. That in effect would repeat the history of the 1994-96 war, when Russian soldiers bloodily conquered Chechnya, only to see guerrillas stealthily retake the country once victory had been declared.
Pushing the offensive further—which Russian officials do not exclude—looks unattractive too. The Chechens are already celebrating the shooting down of at least two Russian aircraft, and claim to have destroyed half a dozen armoured vehicles and captured several Russian soldiers. Russia says only two of its men have been killed, and 22 wounded. Even if true—and the Chechens claim to have killed dozens of Russians—that total would rise sharply should the fighting become hand-to-hand in Chechnya’s towns, let alone mountain warfare. In that sort of conflict, the gritty Chechens excel. The riskiest part of Russia’s immediate plan will be to establish control over Chechnya’s border with Georgia. This has yet to begin.
Both sides seem to think time is on their side. Russia is backing up its military offensive with economic warfare—for example, by cutting back gas and electricity supplies. It has also indicated that it will resettle refugees in the Russian-controlled sector of Chechnya, whether or not they came from there originally. This zone will presumably be well supplied with energy and utilities, to make the point that life under Russia is better.
On the Chechen side, internal squabbles have been set aside. Shamil Basaev, the best-known Chechen warlord, has sarcastically said he is “very grateful” to Russia for creating a new sense of unity among his people. His erstwhile rival, President Aslan Maskhadov, has called on Chechnya’s religious leaders to rally the nation to holy war, “to defend the [country’s] sovereignty and integrity in the name of Allah the benevolent and merciful.” Martial law has been declared in Grozny, although it is not clear who will enforce it.
Over the next few months, it is likely that the combination of winter and Russia’s endemic military disorganisation will hurt the invading forces more than the defenders, although the greatest misery is now borne by the 120,000 refugees.
So far there is no sign of a political compromise between Russia and Chechnya’s leadership. Russia has dusted down the collaborationist Chechen parliament which it used in the previous war, and partly withdrawn its grudging recognition of the Chechen government and president. The Russian side has so far provided no evidence of the terrorist training camps that the war is meant to destroy.
The most worrying thought is that the war may be a prelude to a wider conflict. Russia has denied Azerbaijani claims that its air force bombed a village in Azerbaijan on October 1st, although it has admitted bombing villages in Georgia last month, and has increased the number of soldiers based there. Russia has warned Azerbaijan not to allow aid to Chechnya to cross its territory. In Shia Muslim (but not very devout) Azerbaijan, and in Orthodox Christian Georgia, people are united in hoping against hope that their hard-won modicum of stability, and independence from Russia, are not about to be forfeited
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