The Palestinians' chances of avoiding the worst depend partly on others
Jun 21st 2007
AMERICA has always pinned its hopes on strengthening Mahmoud Abbas, Palestine's president, enough to oust Hamas (unlike many European countries, which hoped the boycott of the Palestinian Authority would make Hamas more moderate). Before the showdown in Gaza, America was hoping Mr Abbas could somehow hold early elections. Now its leaders are repeating at every opportunity Fatah's line that Hamas started the violence. An American official says his country is now choosing which of its aid programmes to restart first, the criterion being that “we want to have an impact quickly”. But, he concedes, it is hard to see an election soon, while Mr Abbas's power to prolong the emergency government is something that “has to be worked out”.
Israeli officials, too, want to bolster Mr Abbas at Hamas's expense. But Israel's instinct will be to make concessions only if Mr Abbas delivers in terms of security and stability, and his ability to deliver will in turn depend on Israeli concessions—the old vicious circle. “They think there'll be a paradise now because tax revenues will come back, but we'll only go back to the situation in 2005,” sighs Mustafa Barghouti, a liberal Palestinian politician who ran against Mr Abbas for the presidency.
The Palestinians' Arab neighbours, meanwhile, are in a quandary. Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were lukewarm allies in the American-led campaign to squeeze Hamas, though they quietly wished for Hamas's demise, for fear that its success would inspire Muslim Brotherhood movements in their own countries. Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak is reported to be planning a summit with Mr Abbas and Israeli and Jordanian leaders.
Jordan and Egypt worry that, if the Gaza-West Bank split persists, Israel will eventually try to dump responsibility for the sundered halves of Palestine on them. Israelis are discussing a long-dormant dream that Jordan, whose population is two-thirds Palestinian, will re-absorb the West Bank—convenient for Israel, but possibly lethal for the Hashemite kingdom. And Egypt, which pulled its mediators out of Gaza in despair and fear, has come out looking particularly bad, since Hamas originally armed itself thanks to criminal gangs smuggling weapons from Egypt.
So the official Arab response to the Palestinian drama has been muted. At a hastily called Arab League meeting, envoys from the 22 states merely proclaimed support for Palestinian unity and formed a fact-finding committee. And while most Arab countries announced their backing for Mr Abbas's new Hamas-free government, even diplomats who blasted Hamas for sabotaging prospects for peace voiced disquiet over punishing Gaza too harshly. Only the Saudis, sore at seeing their hard work in Mecca gone to waste, urged both sides to get back to the negotiating table.
Understandably, many Islamists were cheered by Hamas's takeover of Gaza. Yet they also worry that its victory, accompanied as it was by widely watched violence, could damage their public support and make other Arab governments more determined to crack down on local Islamist movements. The Muslim Brotherhood has notably refrained from public comment, except to decry the violence.
Cheers might have been expected from Syria, too. Bashar Assad's regime plays host to Hamas's exiled leadership, is at odds with Fatah, and presents itself as a bastion of resistance to Israel and America. It may be pleased that its allies have burned America's fingers again. Yet Syria is a staunchly secular country, where membership in the Muslim Brotherhood carries a long jail sentence. Its silence reflects fears either that it, too, might be swept away by an Islamist coup, or that Palestinian infighting will diminish Israel's incentive to sue for peace with Syria.
Hamas's challenge may ultimately affect other Arabs emotionally more than politically. The Palestinian issue is the decades-old touchstone of Arab nationalism. Its abrupt reframing from a heroic struggle against a cruel occupier into a vicious, self-destructive internal scrap exposes the schisms that other Arabs share with the Palestinians—between inept authoritarian rulers and restless subjects, between national and religious markers of identity. The symbolic power of the imagery from Gaza, including Hamas's demolition of the old secret-police headquarters, and the raising of Islamic banners in place of the Palestinian national flag, could be a harbinger of similar struggles elsewhere.
Jun 21st 2007
AMERICA has always pinned its hopes on strengthening Mahmoud Abbas, Palestine's president, enough to oust Hamas (unlike many European countries, which hoped the boycott of the Palestinian Authority would make Hamas more moderate). Before the showdown in Gaza, America was hoping Mr Abbas could somehow hold early elections. Now its leaders are repeating at every opportunity Fatah's line that Hamas started the violence. An American official says his country is now choosing which of its aid programmes to restart first, the criterion being that “we want to have an impact quickly”. But, he concedes, it is hard to see an election soon, while Mr Abbas's power to prolong the emergency government is something that “has to be worked out”.
Israeli officials, too, want to bolster Mr Abbas at Hamas's expense. But Israel's instinct will be to make concessions only if Mr Abbas delivers in terms of security and stability, and his ability to deliver will in turn depend on Israeli concessions—the old vicious circle. “They think there'll be a paradise now because tax revenues will come back, but we'll only go back to the situation in 2005,” sighs Mustafa Barghouti, a liberal Palestinian politician who ran against Mr Abbas for the presidency.
The Palestinians' Arab neighbours, meanwhile, are in a quandary. Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were lukewarm allies in the American-led campaign to squeeze Hamas, though they quietly wished for Hamas's demise, for fear that its success would inspire Muslim Brotherhood movements in their own countries. Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak is reported to be planning a summit with Mr Abbas and Israeli and Jordanian leaders.
Jordan and Egypt worry that, if the Gaza-West Bank split persists, Israel will eventually try to dump responsibility for the sundered halves of Palestine on them. Israelis are discussing a long-dormant dream that Jordan, whose population is two-thirds Palestinian, will re-absorb the West Bank—convenient for Israel, but possibly lethal for the Hashemite kingdom. And Egypt, which pulled its mediators out of Gaza in despair and fear, has come out looking particularly bad, since Hamas originally armed itself thanks to criminal gangs smuggling weapons from Egypt.
So the official Arab response to the Palestinian drama has been muted. At a hastily called Arab League meeting, envoys from the 22 states merely proclaimed support for Palestinian unity and formed a fact-finding committee. And while most Arab countries announced their backing for Mr Abbas's new Hamas-free government, even diplomats who blasted Hamas for sabotaging prospects for peace voiced disquiet over punishing Gaza too harshly. Only the Saudis, sore at seeing their hard work in Mecca gone to waste, urged both sides to get back to the negotiating table.
Understandably, many Islamists were cheered by Hamas's takeover of Gaza. Yet they also worry that its victory, accompanied as it was by widely watched violence, could damage their public support and make other Arab governments more determined to crack down on local Islamist movements. The Muslim Brotherhood has notably refrained from public comment, except to decry the violence.
Cheers might have been expected from Syria, too. Bashar Assad's regime plays host to Hamas's exiled leadership, is at odds with Fatah, and presents itself as a bastion of resistance to Israel and America. It may be pleased that its allies have burned America's fingers again. Yet Syria is a staunchly secular country, where membership in the Muslim Brotherhood carries a long jail sentence. Its silence reflects fears either that it, too, might be swept away by an Islamist coup, or that Palestinian infighting will diminish Israel's incentive to sue for peace with Syria.
Hamas's challenge may ultimately affect other Arabs emotionally more than politically. The Palestinian issue is the decades-old touchstone of Arab nationalism. Its abrupt reframing from a heroic struggle against a cruel occupier into a vicious, self-destructive internal scrap exposes the schisms that other Arabs share with the Palestinians—between inept authoritarian rulers and restless subjects, between national and religious markers of identity. The symbolic power of the imagery from Gaza, including Hamas's demolition of the old secret-police headquarters, and the raising of Islamic banners in place of the Palestinian national flag, could be a harbinger of similar struggles elsewhere.
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