The impending American assault on Afghanistan is fraught with danger for its neighbour. But it may also offer an opportunity
Sep 20th 2001
THESE are nervous days in Pakistan. “If America attacks Afghanistan, people will come on to the streets and a civil war will start,” predicts Muhammad Rashid Khan, who sells digital video disks in Rawalpindi's Hathe Bazaar. Whether or not Mr Khan is right, an American-led war on terrorism could transform Pakistan, as well as the dynamics of its nuclear-tipped confrontation with India.
The country's self-appointed president, Pervez Musharraf, has little choice but to go along with American plans to punish Afghanistan unless it extradites the accused terrorist, Osama bin Laden. He fears that Pakistan's aid-dependent economy, its ability to stand up to India, even its nuclear installations, could be put at risk by American wrath. “Bad results”, he told Pakistanis in a televised speech on September 19th, “could put in danger our territorial integrity and our solidarity.”
On the more positive side, though, there may be much for a compliant Pakistan to gain, including perhaps a partial write-off of its $37 billion external debt and an adjustment to the recent American tilt towards India. It could even be, the wily General Musharraf may be dreaming, a reprise of cold-war days, when an indulgent United States backed up Pakistan for the sake of defeating a common enemy in Afghanistan. If the Taliban fall, Pakistan is expecting a large say in whatever order succeeds them.
Could be, but with dangerous differences, as General Musharraf well knows. The prospective enemy this time is not a godless Soviet-backed regime but an emphatically Islamic one that Pakistan itself has carefully nurtured as a way of furthering twin policies: clout in Central Asia and pressure on India to settle the dispute over Kashmir, a Muslim-majority state divided between the two countries. Barring an unlikely agreement by Afghanistan's Taliban government to hand over Mr bin Laden and his associates, Pakistan has offered intelligence, air space and perhaps, if the president is feeling brave enough, it may provide ground facilities such as airports for an attack on the terrorists and the government that harbours them.
The Taliban have vowed to wage war against any country that joins the attack and are said to have placed anti-aircraft guns along the border with Pakistan. This, though, looks the least of Pakistan's worries. The Afghan army is little threat to one as big and well-equipped as Pakistan's.
Facing blowback
The greater fear is what people in the region call “blowback”. The war to liberate Afghanistan from the Soviet Union in the 1980s flushed refugees by the million and armed zealots in their tens of thousands into Pakistan. It now faces another such influx (thousands of refugees have already come, and many more are at the border), perhaps with more explosive consequences. The target regime shares Pakistan's religion and the Pathan ethnicity of 15% of its population. So far religious groups have taken the lead in protesting at the prospect of American action. At one rally in Islamabad on September 17th, demonstrators wrapped in white shrouds to signify their willingness to die for Islam heard speakers proclaim that “friends of the US are traitors to Pakistan”.
Such carefully-policed gatherings of hundreds help the government, up to a point, by dramatising the risks it runs on behalf of the anti-terror coalition. But if many Afghans were to die in an American-led reprisal, the protests could turn into riots as thousands of ordinary Pakistanis joined the cause, egged on, no doubt, by the various mafias that profit from their dealings with the Taliban. General Musharraf's government, many speculate, might not survive. And the more help he offers the Americans, the greater the outrage he will have to contain. The general tried to pre-empt some of that outrage in his television speech by justifying the alliance as a blow against a bigger enemy, India. The Prophet Muhammad, he said, would have chosen the same course.
Pakistan could emerge from a showdown with the religious right as a more liberal society and, perhaps, a more authoritarian polity at the same time. Since taking power in October 1999, General Musharraf has tried to tame the groups that preach Islam in its least tolerant form and sometimes kill members of sects that disagree with them. But he has been hesitant in pursuing such policies as the disarming of extremists. “Now the state may have to have a direct confrontation,” says Shireen Mazari, director of Pakistan's Institute of Strategic Studies. One casualty of a tougher line could be the “road map” to democracy, which ordains the holding of elections by next October. In the circumstances, the United States might not object too loudly.
The Kashmir connection
Could General Musharraf engineer a coup of a different sort in relations with India? At first sight, the crisis plays into his hands. Pakistan has long tried to draw attention to Kashmir, portraying the dispute, correctly, as a “nuclear flashpoint”. Now that the strikes against America have highlighted Muslim discontent, this ought to be easier. Part of its reward for joining the anti-terror coalition, Pakistan hopes, will be American help in forcing India to negotiate seriously over Kashmir.
This could be optimistic. India, too, will be a coalition member, though presumably a less valuable one since it has no border with Afghanistan. More worrying for Pakistan, the outrages in America pile additional discredit on its political and probable military support for the mujahideen who cross into India's side of Kashmir from bases in the Pakistani portion. Their targets are not just Indian soldiers; they are the likeliest suspects in frequent massacres of non-Muslim civilians.
Many of these groups train their fighters in Afghanistan. General Musharraf insists that their activities are not terrorist, but the distinction may collapse in American attacks on mujahideen installations in Afghanistan. The Indians will point to the camps in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Unless they are closed, those Indians who advocate “hot pursuit” of militants across the de facto border will no doubt press their case more strongly than ever.
There is thus a danger that the American-led war on terror will merely entrench south Asians in their earlier positions. But there is still a chance of a better outcome, if the fanatics are defeated and the moderate majority is shocked into compromise. This could be a defining moment indeed
Sep 20th 2001
THESE are nervous days in Pakistan. “If America attacks Afghanistan, people will come on to the streets and a civil war will start,” predicts Muhammad Rashid Khan, who sells digital video disks in Rawalpindi's Hathe Bazaar. Whether or not Mr Khan is right, an American-led war on terrorism could transform Pakistan, as well as the dynamics of its nuclear-tipped confrontation with India.
The country's self-appointed president, Pervez Musharraf, has little choice but to go along with American plans to punish Afghanistan unless it extradites the accused terrorist, Osama bin Laden. He fears that Pakistan's aid-dependent economy, its ability to stand up to India, even its nuclear installations, could be put at risk by American wrath. “Bad results”, he told Pakistanis in a televised speech on September 19th, “could put in danger our territorial integrity and our solidarity.”
On the more positive side, though, there may be much for a compliant Pakistan to gain, including perhaps a partial write-off of its $37 billion external debt and an adjustment to the recent American tilt towards India. It could even be, the wily General Musharraf may be dreaming, a reprise of cold-war days, when an indulgent United States backed up Pakistan for the sake of defeating a common enemy in Afghanistan. If the Taliban fall, Pakistan is expecting a large say in whatever order succeeds them.
Could be, but with dangerous differences, as General Musharraf well knows. The prospective enemy this time is not a godless Soviet-backed regime but an emphatically Islamic one that Pakistan itself has carefully nurtured as a way of furthering twin policies: clout in Central Asia and pressure on India to settle the dispute over Kashmir, a Muslim-majority state divided between the two countries. Barring an unlikely agreement by Afghanistan's Taliban government to hand over Mr bin Laden and his associates, Pakistan has offered intelligence, air space and perhaps, if the president is feeling brave enough, it may provide ground facilities such as airports for an attack on the terrorists and the government that harbours them.
The Taliban have vowed to wage war against any country that joins the attack and are said to have placed anti-aircraft guns along the border with Pakistan. This, though, looks the least of Pakistan's worries. The Afghan army is little threat to one as big and well-equipped as Pakistan's.
Facing blowback
The greater fear is what people in the region call “blowback”. The war to liberate Afghanistan from the Soviet Union in the 1980s flushed refugees by the million and armed zealots in their tens of thousands into Pakistan. It now faces another such influx (thousands of refugees have already come, and many more are at the border), perhaps with more explosive consequences. The target regime shares Pakistan's religion and the Pathan ethnicity of 15% of its population. So far religious groups have taken the lead in protesting at the prospect of American action. At one rally in Islamabad on September 17th, demonstrators wrapped in white shrouds to signify their willingness to die for Islam heard speakers proclaim that “friends of the US are traitors to Pakistan”.
Such carefully-policed gatherings of hundreds help the government, up to a point, by dramatising the risks it runs on behalf of the anti-terror coalition. But if many Afghans were to die in an American-led reprisal, the protests could turn into riots as thousands of ordinary Pakistanis joined the cause, egged on, no doubt, by the various mafias that profit from their dealings with the Taliban. General Musharraf's government, many speculate, might not survive. And the more help he offers the Americans, the greater the outrage he will have to contain. The general tried to pre-empt some of that outrage in his television speech by justifying the alliance as a blow against a bigger enemy, India. The Prophet Muhammad, he said, would have chosen the same course.
Pakistan could emerge from a showdown with the religious right as a more liberal society and, perhaps, a more authoritarian polity at the same time. Since taking power in October 1999, General Musharraf has tried to tame the groups that preach Islam in its least tolerant form and sometimes kill members of sects that disagree with them. But he has been hesitant in pursuing such policies as the disarming of extremists. “Now the state may have to have a direct confrontation,” says Shireen Mazari, director of Pakistan's Institute of Strategic Studies. One casualty of a tougher line could be the “road map” to democracy, which ordains the holding of elections by next October. In the circumstances, the United States might not object too loudly.
The Kashmir connection
Could General Musharraf engineer a coup of a different sort in relations with India? At first sight, the crisis plays into his hands. Pakistan has long tried to draw attention to Kashmir, portraying the dispute, correctly, as a “nuclear flashpoint”. Now that the strikes against America have highlighted Muslim discontent, this ought to be easier. Part of its reward for joining the anti-terror coalition, Pakistan hopes, will be American help in forcing India to negotiate seriously over Kashmir.
This could be optimistic. India, too, will be a coalition member, though presumably a less valuable one since it has no border with Afghanistan. More worrying for Pakistan, the outrages in America pile additional discredit on its political and probable military support for the mujahideen who cross into India's side of Kashmir from bases in the Pakistani portion. Their targets are not just Indian soldiers; they are the likeliest suspects in frequent massacres of non-Muslim civilians.
Many of these groups train their fighters in Afghanistan. General Musharraf insists that their activities are not terrorist, but the distinction may collapse in American attacks on mujahideen installations in Afghanistan. The Indians will point to the camps in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Unless they are closed, those Indians who advocate “hot pursuit” of militants across the de facto border will no doubt press their case more strongly than ever.
There is thus a danger that the American-led war on terror will merely entrench south Asians in their earlier positions. But there is still a chance of a better outcome, if the fanatics are defeated and the moderate majority is shocked into compromise. This could be a defining moment indeed
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