To fight will be hard. But not to fight would be worse
Sep 20th 2001
IT WILL be long. It will cause anguish and arguments, both with allies and with others. It will involve more casualties, both military and civilian. It is as hard to define the exact objective as it will be to tell whether or when that objective has been achieved. It will be fraught with risks, both directly for the forces involved and indirectly for many of the governments and relationships that will be affected. Yet the battle that President George Bush and his advisers are now planning and preparing is nevertheless a battle that cannot be avoided. It must be fought, and won.
Many are afraid of the battle that lies ahead. Some are horribly, even obscenely wrong in their reasons for objecting to it, notably those who blame America itself for the horrors that were inflicted upon it last week in New York and Washington, DC (see article). But others are understandably afraid, and are opposed to it for nobler-sounding reasons. They think retaliation would be to stoop as low as the terrorists. They think it would be wrong for more ordinary people to die, in Afghanistan or in a new cycle of violence elsewhere. They argue that it would be better to do nothing beyond self-protection, because that would deprive the terrorists of the satisfaction of having provoked a reaction, especially a reaction whose chances of success look daunting. They want peace, not war.
The sad truth of human relations, however, is that you cannot get peace without fighting for it. Doing nothing would invite far worse consequences than doing something, perilous though that is. It would simply be to delay action rather than to avert it. It would encourage other tyrants and trouble-makers to believe that they can mount such attacks with impunity, in any country in the world, for if America cannot or will not hit back, then perhaps nobody can. Such attacks could well use even more fearsome means, including biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. It would be likely, indeed, that the same network of terrorists that planned last week's attacks would soon mount others, killing yet more innocent people and sowing even more fear. For one observation by the pacifists is surely true: that the terrorists do want to provoke a reaction, and will carry on their attacks until they get one.
It is almost always wrong to dismiss terrorism as “irrational”. The word may seem appropriate when the perpetrators commit suicide in order to carry out their attacks, but it is misleading: terrorism is a horribly calculated attempt to use violence to help achieve an objective. Revenge against America over perceived grievances and acts in the past may doubtless play a part. But there is likely to be more, much more, to this act than that. The aim is plainly destabilisation, both of America itself and of the broad status quo in the world. More particularly, the aim is likely to be the destabilisation of the Middle East and Central Asia, to alter or even remove the presence there of both America and Israel, and to change or destroy the regimes governing the countries of that turbulent region.
That is where the perils will be greatest. The action that must be taken will itself risk bringing about the very destabilisation that the terrorists desire. When attempting to defeat one enemy it is all too easy to create others. Many of the regimes of the Middle East face opposition on their own streets from their own discontented people and from violent groups who will be quick to exploit it if the government is seen to back an American response that goes wrong or is considered to have been misdirected. That worry applies above all to Saudi Arabia, the richest Arab nation, home to Mecca and Medina, and base for American soldiers. Osama bin Laden, if he is the string-puller behind the attacks, would dearly love to see the Saudi regime overthrown and the bases ejected.
Focus, with friends
Even a perilous battle must still be fought. But how? There is also the peril of failure, of revealing your own impotence, when trying to seek out and capture or destroy an elusive terrorist network some of which may be hiding in the caves and mountains of Afghanistan, and some of which may be lurking in the cities and suburbs of your own country. That, after all, was the result in 1998 when the bloody bombings of two American embassies in Africa gave rise simply to an American bombardment which had no discernible effect.
The first requirement is determination. Part of the terrorist's calculation is probably that the will to fight is weak in a modern democracy; that Americans' support for military action will buckle at the sight of the first body bags, and that European allies could show even less stomach for the task. Almost certainly, that is also the terrorists' biggest mistake. In a war launched directly on Americans, on American soil, the will to fight back is going to be great and long-lasting. The patriotic mood in America last week was not bellicose, as many European leftists have claimed: it was sombre, deep-seated and determined. There is certainly a risk that some European countries may not share that determination once the fighting nears; some have already begun to shrink back from it. But to fail to support, and in some cases fight alongside, America would be folly, grand scale: it would not only encourage further terror, but would also shatter American willingness to do anything to help defend Europe in the future.
The second requirement is a sense of priorities. President Bush and others have been right to say that the enemy is not just the terrorists themselves but also those countries that harbour and foster them. But the more ambitious the effort, the less likely it is to succeed. No commander likes to fight on several fronts at once. President Bush will need to choose what his top priority should be—probably Osama bin Laden and his network (see article)—and focus first on that, rather than embarking immediately upon a wider war.
The third requirement is patience. This is not a task that can be completed quickly, nor is it one in which military means alone will suffice. America needs not only military allies among its usual friends in NATO, but also support from the Islamic states that surround Afghanistan and other hosts of terrorism, and from all countries through which the terrorists organise their finances and their logistics. Ideally, America would first cut off the network's nourishment, then isolate it and its leaders, and then move in to defeat it. Diplomacy, to elicit or induce co-operation from many countries, is therefore going to be vital (see “Fighting terrorism” and “The military options”).
That is most vital of all for the fourth requirement: intelligence. In this difficult, tortuous task, the word counts in both of its senses. With regional allies, it is the second sense, of espionage and information, that matters most. To reach those terrorists who are hiding in Afghanistan or elsewhere, American forces will need both to learn where they are and to be able to get there quickly. They therefore need help from other countries' intelligence services, as well as co-operation to be able to base their forces near to the terrorists' hiding places.
Although military action may begin with aerial bombardment of some sort, the real job is likely to be done by highly mobile special forces, mounting attacks from a number of different bases. It will not be a big, set-piece battle like the Gulf war. Nor will it be a battle in which there is one clear opponent to be fought and vanquished: defeats will have to be meted out, on terrorist bands and, quite probably, on their Taliban hosts. Such victories will be necessary, both to deter enemies and to encourage supporters, but they will not add up to an ultimate victory, for terrorist networks are too fragmented and insidious for that. What the deaths of more than 5,000 people showed, on September 11th, was that we will always be vulnerable to extremists' acts, however sophisticated our technology or our society. The price of liberty, as Thomas Jefferson pointed out two centuries ago, is eternal vigilance.
Sep 20th 2001
IT WILL be long. It will cause anguish and arguments, both with allies and with others. It will involve more casualties, both military and civilian. It is as hard to define the exact objective as it will be to tell whether or when that objective has been achieved. It will be fraught with risks, both directly for the forces involved and indirectly for many of the governments and relationships that will be affected. Yet the battle that President George Bush and his advisers are now planning and preparing is nevertheless a battle that cannot be avoided. It must be fought, and won.
Many are afraid of the battle that lies ahead. Some are horribly, even obscenely wrong in their reasons for objecting to it, notably those who blame America itself for the horrors that were inflicted upon it last week in New York and Washington, DC (see article). But others are understandably afraid, and are opposed to it for nobler-sounding reasons. They think retaliation would be to stoop as low as the terrorists. They think it would be wrong for more ordinary people to die, in Afghanistan or in a new cycle of violence elsewhere. They argue that it would be better to do nothing beyond self-protection, because that would deprive the terrorists of the satisfaction of having provoked a reaction, especially a reaction whose chances of success look daunting. They want peace, not war.
The sad truth of human relations, however, is that you cannot get peace without fighting for it. Doing nothing would invite far worse consequences than doing something, perilous though that is. It would simply be to delay action rather than to avert it. It would encourage other tyrants and trouble-makers to believe that they can mount such attacks with impunity, in any country in the world, for if America cannot or will not hit back, then perhaps nobody can. Such attacks could well use even more fearsome means, including biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. It would be likely, indeed, that the same network of terrorists that planned last week's attacks would soon mount others, killing yet more innocent people and sowing even more fear. For one observation by the pacifists is surely true: that the terrorists do want to provoke a reaction, and will carry on their attacks until they get one.
It is almost always wrong to dismiss terrorism as “irrational”. The word may seem appropriate when the perpetrators commit suicide in order to carry out their attacks, but it is misleading: terrorism is a horribly calculated attempt to use violence to help achieve an objective. Revenge against America over perceived grievances and acts in the past may doubtless play a part. But there is likely to be more, much more, to this act than that. The aim is plainly destabilisation, both of America itself and of the broad status quo in the world. More particularly, the aim is likely to be the destabilisation of the Middle East and Central Asia, to alter or even remove the presence there of both America and Israel, and to change or destroy the regimes governing the countries of that turbulent region.
That is where the perils will be greatest. The action that must be taken will itself risk bringing about the very destabilisation that the terrorists desire. When attempting to defeat one enemy it is all too easy to create others. Many of the regimes of the Middle East face opposition on their own streets from their own discontented people and from violent groups who will be quick to exploit it if the government is seen to back an American response that goes wrong or is considered to have been misdirected. That worry applies above all to Saudi Arabia, the richest Arab nation, home to Mecca and Medina, and base for American soldiers. Osama bin Laden, if he is the string-puller behind the attacks, would dearly love to see the Saudi regime overthrown and the bases ejected.
Focus, with friends
Even a perilous battle must still be fought. But how? There is also the peril of failure, of revealing your own impotence, when trying to seek out and capture or destroy an elusive terrorist network some of which may be hiding in the caves and mountains of Afghanistan, and some of which may be lurking in the cities and suburbs of your own country. That, after all, was the result in 1998 when the bloody bombings of two American embassies in Africa gave rise simply to an American bombardment which had no discernible effect.
The first requirement is determination. Part of the terrorist's calculation is probably that the will to fight is weak in a modern democracy; that Americans' support for military action will buckle at the sight of the first body bags, and that European allies could show even less stomach for the task. Almost certainly, that is also the terrorists' biggest mistake. In a war launched directly on Americans, on American soil, the will to fight back is going to be great and long-lasting. The patriotic mood in America last week was not bellicose, as many European leftists have claimed: it was sombre, deep-seated and determined. There is certainly a risk that some European countries may not share that determination once the fighting nears; some have already begun to shrink back from it. But to fail to support, and in some cases fight alongside, America would be folly, grand scale: it would not only encourage further terror, but would also shatter American willingness to do anything to help defend Europe in the future.
The second requirement is a sense of priorities. President Bush and others have been right to say that the enemy is not just the terrorists themselves but also those countries that harbour and foster them. But the more ambitious the effort, the less likely it is to succeed. No commander likes to fight on several fronts at once. President Bush will need to choose what his top priority should be—probably Osama bin Laden and his network (see article)—and focus first on that, rather than embarking immediately upon a wider war.
The third requirement is patience. This is not a task that can be completed quickly, nor is it one in which military means alone will suffice. America needs not only military allies among its usual friends in NATO, but also support from the Islamic states that surround Afghanistan and other hosts of terrorism, and from all countries through which the terrorists organise their finances and their logistics. Ideally, America would first cut off the network's nourishment, then isolate it and its leaders, and then move in to defeat it. Diplomacy, to elicit or induce co-operation from many countries, is therefore going to be vital (see “Fighting terrorism” and “The military options”).
That is most vital of all for the fourth requirement: intelligence. In this difficult, tortuous task, the word counts in both of its senses. With regional allies, it is the second sense, of espionage and information, that matters most. To reach those terrorists who are hiding in Afghanistan or elsewhere, American forces will need both to learn where they are and to be able to get there quickly. They therefore need help from other countries' intelligence services, as well as co-operation to be able to base their forces near to the terrorists' hiding places.
Although military action may begin with aerial bombardment of some sort, the real job is likely to be done by highly mobile special forces, mounting attacks from a number of different bases. It will not be a big, set-piece battle like the Gulf war. Nor will it be a battle in which there is one clear opponent to be fought and vanquished: defeats will have to be meted out, on terrorist bands and, quite probably, on their Taliban hosts. Such victories will be necessary, both to deter enemies and to encourage supporters, but they will not add up to an ultimate victory, for terrorist networks are too fragmented and insidious for that. What the deaths of more than 5,000 people showed, on September 11th, was that we will always be vulnerable to extremists' acts, however sophisticated our technology or our society. The price of liberty, as Thomas Jefferson pointed out two centuries ago, is eternal vigilance.
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