Israel and the Palestinians are groping towards a fragile truce
Sep 20th 2001
STRANGE are the uses of adversity. In a single week of intensive diplomacy after the terror attacks in Washington and New York, America seemed to have pushed Israel and the Palestinians into a ceasefire in the West Bank and Gaza. On September 18th Yasser Arafat called on the Palestinians to stop shooting, even in their own defence. In return, Ariel Sharon, Israel's prime minister, ordered his army to stop offensive actions against the Palestinians and pull back from its advanced positions. This might, said Shimon Peres, Israel's indefatigable foreign minister, be a “turning-point”.
Perhaps. But even if the ceasefire holds, the fact is that there has been no meeting of minds between Mr Sharon and Mr Arafat. Rather, each has been made to understand that neither can afford to cross the United States in its hour of need and peril. America intends to build the widest possible coalition before launching its counter-strike against terrorism. The unequal struggle in the Palestinian territories, televised daily around the Arab world, makes it harder for Muslim countries to join an alliance led by Israel's chief ally. Ergo, that fighting must end.
This is a tactical setback for Mr Sharon. He had hoped that the attack on America would unite Israel and America against Islamic terrorism, and bring home to Americans the suffering of Israeli civilians at the hands of Palestinian suicide bombers. Calling Mr Arafat Israel's Osama bin Laden, Mr Sharon had cancelled a meeting between Mr Arafat and Mr Peres, on the ground that such a meeting at such a time would bestow legitimacy on a terrorist.
The Americans, it seemed, were having none of this. At midweek, the Arafat-Peres meeting seemed poised to go ahead, provided—in deference to Mr Sharon—that there were first at least 48 hours of calm on the ground. The killing of an Israeli woman in a “drive-by” shooting near a settlement south of Jerusalem on September 20th seemed by itself unlikely to disturb progress. Meanwhile, Colin Powell, America's secretary of state, had swiftly dismissed the possibility of Israeli forces joining any military action that the Americans might be planning.
For Mr Arafat, the American-imposed truce may be an opportunity. His difficulty since the intifada began has lain in working out how to end it without having any diplomatic gain to show for the loss of some 600 Palestinian lives. The Israelis are still intent on giving him none: hence their refusal to negotiate “under fire”. With the pattern of Middle Eastern alliances suddenly shifting, Mr Arafat can now try to persuade his people that it is time to show they are on America's side. This will not be easy, given that many of them plainly are not. Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the groups that have specialised in suicide attacks against Israelis, may react with redoubled fury if they perceive America's coalition to be directed against the militant Islamism to which they subscribe themselves.
What, though, if a ceasefire were to take hold? The two sides could then move on to implement the provisions of the Mitchell Commission's report, compiled earlier this year. The report calls for military redeployment, a settlement freeze, the lifting of closures and other restrictions on civilian life in the Palestinian territories and, above all, for resumed peace talks. Just to get that far would be a minor miracle. Mr Sharon is strongly attached to the West Bank settlers and so opposes a settlement freeze. And even if serious peace talks did resume, their chances of success would be remote.
And next?
The little common ground that seemed to exist at last year's Camp David summit, when Ehud Barak was Israel's prime minister, has been washed away by a year of recrimination and bloodshed. Mr Sharon has made no secret of his belief that Mr Barak's negotiations with the Palestinians went too far, and that they must eventually be made to settle for far less than they were offered by his predecessor. Many Israelis who supported Mr Barak have grown hawkish as a result of the Palestinians' bloody intifada. Given that the Palestinian negotiators rejected as inadequate the very terms that Mr Sharon views as too generous, there seems little prospect, under their present leaders, of the two sides reaching an early peace deal.
From the Bush administration's point of view, all of this is now a problem for the medium-to-distant future. What matters for the present is to soothe the sore of Palestine while Arabs elsewhere are coaxed into Mr Bush's grand alliance against terrorism. This is chastening for Israel. In the Gulf war, the last time the Americans asked them to keep their heads down and exude sweet reason, their reward was to be bombarded in their cities by Saddam Hussein's Scud missiles.
Even if Israel is spared, this time, the frustration of being hit and not being allowed to hit back, it is likely to face the intensely uncomfortable situation of being frozen out of the evolving international coalition of what President George Bush himself calls “good against evil”, while its enemies, among them states that have long trysted with terror, are assiduously wooed by the Americans.
Sep 20th 2001
STRANGE are the uses of adversity. In a single week of intensive diplomacy after the terror attacks in Washington and New York, America seemed to have pushed Israel and the Palestinians into a ceasefire in the West Bank and Gaza. On September 18th Yasser Arafat called on the Palestinians to stop shooting, even in their own defence. In return, Ariel Sharon, Israel's prime minister, ordered his army to stop offensive actions against the Palestinians and pull back from its advanced positions. This might, said Shimon Peres, Israel's indefatigable foreign minister, be a “turning-point”.
Perhaps. But even if the ceasefire holds, the fact is that there has been no meeting of minds between Mr Sharon and Mr Arafat. Rather, each has been made to understand that neither can afford to cross the United States in its hour of need and peril. America intends to build the widest possible coalition before launching its counter-strike against terrorism. The unequal struggle in the Palestinian territories, televised daily around the Arab world, makes it harder for Muslim countries to join an alliance led by Israel's chief ally. Ergo, that fighting must end.
This is a tactical setback for Mr Sharon. He had hoped that the attack on America would unite Israel and America against Islamic terrorism, and bring home to Americans the suffering of Israeli civilians at the hands of Palestinian suicide bombers. Calling Mr Arafat Israel's Osama bin Laden, Mr Sharon had cancelled a meeting between Mr Arafat and Mr Peres, on the ground that such a meeting at such a time would bestow legitimacy on a terrorist.
The Americans, it seemed, were having none of this. At midweek, the Arafat-Peres meeting seemed poised to go ahead, provided—in deference to Mr Sharon—that there were first at least 48 hours of calm on the ground. The killing of an Israeli woman in a “drive-by” shooting near a settlement south of Jerusalem on September 20th seemed by itself unlikely to disturb progress. Meanwhile, Colin Powell, America's secretary of state, had swiftly dismissed the possibility of Israeli forces joining any military action that the Americans might be planning.
For Mr Arafat, the American-imposed truce may be an opportunity. His difficulty since the intifada began has lain in working out how to end it without having any diplomatic gain to show for the loss of some 600 Palestinian lives. The Israelis are still intent on giving him none: hence their refusal to negotiate “under fire”. With the pattern of Middle Eastern alliances suddenly shifting, Mr Arafat can now try to persuade his people that it is time to show they are on America's side. This will not be easy, given that many of them plainly are not. Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the groups that have specialised in suicide attacks against Israelis, may react with redoubled fury if they perceive America's coalition to be directed against the militant Islamism to which they subscribe themselves.
What, though, if a ceasefire were to take hold? The two sides could then move on to implement the provisions of the Mitchell Commission's report, compiled earlier this year. The report calls for military redeployment, a settlement freeze, the lifting of closures and other restrictions on civilian life in the Palestinian territories and, above all, for resumed peace talks. Just to get that far would be a minor miracle. Mr Sharon is strongly attached to the West Bank settlers and so opposes a settlement freeze. And even if serious peace talks did resume, their chances of success would be remote.
And next?
The little common ground that seemed to exist at last year's Camp David summit, when Ehud Barak was Israel's prime minister, has been washed away by a year of recrimination and bloodshed. Mr Sharon has made no secret of his belief that Mr Barak's negotiations with the Palestinians went too far, and that they must eventually be made to settle for far less than they were offered by his predecessor. Many Israelis who supported Mr Barak have grown hawkish as a result of the Palestinians' bloody intifada. Given that the Palestinian negotiators rejected as inadequate the very terms that Mr Sharon views as too generous, there seems little prospect, under their present leaders, of the two sides reaching an early peace deal.
From the Bush administration's point of view, all of this is now a problem for the medium-to-distant future. What matters for the present is to soothe the sore of Palestine while Arabs elsewhere are coaxed into Mr Bush's grand alliance against terrorism. This is chastening for Israel. In the Gulf war, the last time the Americans asked them to keep their heads down and exude sweet reason, their reward was to be bombarded in their cities by Saddam Hussein's Scud missiles.
Even if Israel is spared, this time, the frustration of being hit and not being allowed to hit back, it is likely to face the intensely uncomfortable situation of being frozen out of the evolving international coalition of what President George Bush himself calls “good against evil”, while its enemies, among them states that have long trysted with terror, are assiduously wooed by the Americans.
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